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Measurement Device Independent Quantum Private Query (MDI QPQ) with qutrits is presented.
We compare the database security and client’s privacy in MDI QPQ for qubits with qutrits. For some
instances, we observe that qutrit will provide better security for database than qubit. However, when
it comes to the question of client’s privacy we have to take additional measures in case of qutrit.
Hence we conclude that though in case of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) higher dimension
provides better security but in case of QPQ this is not obvious.
I. INTRODUCTION
The very first protocol of quantum cryptography was Bennett and Brassard’s BB84 [1] key distribution protocol.
In these thirty years, the field is progressing gradually. Though the main focus of quantum cryptography is quantum
key distribution (QKD), [1–4] which is to establish a secret key between two distant parties, several other quantum
cryptographic primitives have also been proposed and actively studied, such as quantum secret sharing (QSS), [5,
6] quantum secure direct communication, (QSDC) [7–9] quantum private query (QPQ), [10–14] quantum position
verification (QPV) [15] and so on.
Measurement-device-independent (MDI) technique is a very powerful and important technique in quantum cryp-
tography. It allows the secure quantum communication using imperfect measurement devices. This has been done for
QKD, QPQ with qubit. Recently, MDI-QSDC [16] has been proposed.
Let us consider the situation where Bob is a database provider and Alice is a user. Now Alice wants to know a
certain element from that database without providing any information about her query to Bob. On the other hand,
Bob tries to resist Alice to know any other elements from the database except her query. The first one is called user
or client’s privacy whereas the second one is known as database security. This problem is a variant of Symmetric
Private Information Retrieval (SPIR). The hardness assumptions which are exploited in SPIR protocols [17, 18] are
proven to be vulnerable in quantum domain. This is why the researcher searched for some SPIR protocols which can
resist the quantum adversary, an adversary having unbounded power of computation. In [19] it has been shown that
a prefect quantum SPIR protocol is impossible. However, Giovannetti et al. [10] came out with a variant of this and
called it Quantum Private Query (QPQ). Some relaxations in the security notions had made it feasible in quantum
paradigm.
However, the protocol suggested by Giovannetti et al. was purely theoretical and difficult for implementation.
Jacobi et al. [11] for the first time proposed a practical QPQ protocol based on SARG04 [3] QKD protocol. Using
SARG04 QKD protocol, an asymmetric key which is used to encrypt the whole database, is distributed between Bob
and Alice. According to the protocol, 14 portion of the key is known to Alice. Gao et al. [12] proposed a flexible
QPQ protocol (formally known as GLWC protocol) by generalizing Jacobi’s protocol. The difference is that in GLWC
protocol Alice knows sin
2 θ
2 portion of the key, where the parameter θ ∈ (0, pi2 ) is chosen by Bob based on the required
amount of security. For θ < pi4 , GLWC protocol provides better database security but there is a high probability to
guess the address of Alice’s query. To solve this issue, Yang et al. [13] proposed an entanglement based QPQ protocol
based on B92 [2] QKD Protocol.
Very recently, Zhao et al. [14] has developed a detector-blinding attack by dishonest Bob on Jacobi and GLWC
protocol and shown that how detector’s side channel attack breaks the user privacy completely. To remove all such
type of side channel attacks, they then proposed a Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QPQ protocol exploiting
MDI QKD [20–22].
In MDI QKD, Alice and Bob send their encoded photons to an untrusted third party (UTP) Charlie who performs
the Bell state measurement (BSM) and announces the measurement result to Alice and Bob. Depending on Charlie’s
announcement, Alice and Bob can find a correlation between their photons and thus can establish a secret key between
themselves. In MDI QPQ [14], this idea has been exploited to establish an asymmetric key between Bob and Alice.
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2Database privacy remains same as previous QPQ protocols [12, 13]. They proved the loss tolerance user privacy under
some specific attack models.
Recently, Jo and Son [4] have proposed a MDI QKD protocol using qutrits. It is expected that a higher dimensional
state can carry more information per quanta than a qubit. And hence they have noticed an enhancement in key rate
compared to qubit MDI QKD.
Motivated by this, we try to understand if it is indeed the case for all cryptographic primitives. In this direction,
we explore MDI QPQ for qutrit. We observe that for some instances if we go for higher dimension, then it is possible
to obtain better database security. However, in such cases to protect the user privacy we have to consider some
additional measures. That indicates that in case of qutrit we can not optimize both database security and user
privacy simultaneously. The security issues are very much protocol specific. It disproved our conjecture that higher
dimension always provides better security.
II. MEASUREMENT DEVICE INDEPENDENT QUANTUM PRIVATE QUERY USING QUTRITS
In this section we first accumulate some assumptions necessary for this protocol. Then we will enumerate MDI-QPQ
for qutrit.
A. Necessary Assumptions
1. In an honest run of the protocol, Alice and Bob do not deviate from the actions they are supposed to do.
2. In an honest run of the protocol, Alice or Bob does not collude with Charlie, the untrusted third party.
B. MDI-QPQ with Qutrit
In case of qutrit the dimension of Hilbert space is three. The general form of a qutrit |ψ〉 can be expressed as
|ψ〉 = cos γ1 |0〉+ sin γ1 cos γ2 |1〉+ sin γ1 sin γ2 |2〉 , (1)
where γ1, γ2 are parameters such that 0 ≤ γ1, γ2 ≤ pi2 .
By applying a specific unitary transformation on the computational basis vectors {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉}, one can get a set of
orthonormal basis vectors which includes the state of (1). Following are the examples of such basis states.
|0′〉 = U(|0〉)
= cos γ1 |0〉+ sin γ1 cos γ2 |1〉+ sin γ1 sin γ2 |2〉
|1′〉 = U(|1〉)
= − sin γ1 |0〉+ cos γ1 cos γ2 |1〉+ cos γ1 sin γ2 |2〉
|2′〉 = U(|2〉)
= − sin γ2 |1〉+ cos γ2 |2〉
There are nine maximally entangled states of the three dimensional bipartite system. We define {|φi〉} as the set
of three-dimensional maximally entangled states, where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 8}, and each state is described as
|φ3k+l〉 = 1√
3
2∑
m=0
ωml |m+ k,m〉 (2)
where k, l ∈ {0, 1, 2} and ω = e 2pii3 . We omit (mod 3) from all indices for simplification. Then the three-dimensional
Bell state measurement (3d-BSM) is defined as a set of projections {Pˆi = |φi〉 〈φi|}.
In MDI QPQ, Charlie performs the Bell state measurement (BSM) with the photons coming from Bob and Alice
in the motivation towards establishing an asymmetric key between Alice and Bob. Charlie may play the role of an
eavesdropper.
3However, the QPQ protocol is viewed as a mistrustful cryptographic primitive. Hence, we need not to consider an
outsider (Charlie) as an eavesdropper. Either Bob or Alice may behave as an adversary. We will analyze the security
issues in this initiative.
Protocol:
1. Bob sends, uniformly at random, one of the six polarized states |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |0′〉, |1′〉, |2′〉 to Charlie, where
γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, pi2 ). The rectilinear basis {|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉} encodes to key bit 0 and the basis{|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} encodes to
the key bit 1.
2. Alice sends, uniformly at random, one of the six polarized states |0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |0′〉, |1′〉, |2′〉 to Charlie. The
parameters γ1, γ2 are same as Bob. They should have prior discussion about this.
3. Charlie performs the BSM and declares the results publicly. Alice records the measurement result. In fact, she
needs to identify only the Bell state |φ0〉. Theoretical probabilities for obtaining |φ0〉 for different combinations
are shown in the Table 1.
4. For each trial Charlie obtained a Bell state |φ0〉, Bob announces a trit 0 to Alice if he has sent |0〉 or |0′〉, 1 if
he has sent |1〉 or |1′〉 and 2 if he has sent|2〉 or |2′〉.
5. Depending on the state Alice has sent to Charlie and the declaration of Bob she will try to guess the key bit.
6. After the key establishment Alice and Bob go for error correction to check the noise in the channel.
7. If Alice knows the jth bit of the key K and wants to know the ith element of the database, she declares the
integer s = j − i. Bob shifts K by s and hence gets a new key, say K0.
8. Bob encrypts his database by this new key K0 with one-time pad and sends the encrypted database to Alice.
Alice decrypts the value with her jth key bit and gets the required element of the database.
We now discuss how Alice obtains a conclusive raw key bit.
1. If Bob has sent the state |0〉 and announced the trit 0, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |0〉
and thus the raw key bit 0 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |1′〉.
2. If Bob has sent the state |0′〉 and announced the trit 0, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |0′〉
and thus the raw key bit 1 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |1〉 or |2〉.
3. If Bob has sent the state |1〉 and announced the trit 1, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |1〉
and thus the raw key bit 0 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |0′〉 or |2′〉.
4. If Bob has sent the state |1′〉 and announced the trit 1, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |1′〉
and thus the raw key bit 1 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |0〉 or |2〉.
5. If Bob has sent the state |2〉 and announced the trit 2, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |2〉
and thus the raw key bit 0 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |0′〉 or |1′〉.
6. If Bob has sent the state |2′〉 and announced the trit 2, according to Table 1, Alice can identify Bob’s state |2′〉
and thus the raw key bit 1 with certainty only if she has prepared the state |1〉.
Bob
|0〉 |1〉 |2〉 ∣∣0′〉 ∣∣1′〉 ∣∣2′〉
Alice
|0〉 13 0 0 13 cos2 γ1 13 sin2 γ1 0
|1〉 0 13 0 13 sin2 γ1 cos2 γ2 13 cos2 γ1 cos2 γ2 13 sin2 γ2
|2〉 0 0 13 13 sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 13 cos2 γ1 sin2 γ2 13 cos2 γ2∣∣0′〉 13 cos2 γ1 13 sin2 γ1 cos2 γ2 13 sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 13 0 0∣∣1′〉 13 sin2 γ1 13 cos2 γ1 cos2 γ2 13 cos2 γ1 sin2 γ2 0 13 0∣∣2′〉 0 13 sin2 γ2 13 cos2 γ2 0 0 13
TABLE I: Theoretical probabilities for obtaining Bell state |φ0〉 for different combination of states
Note that Table 1 is not normalized. To normalized it we have to divide every elements of the table by a fraction
2
3 . Table 2 cumulates the normalized elements of Table 1.
4Bob
|0〉 |1〉 |2〉 ∣∣0′〉 ∣∣1′〉 ∣∣2′〉
Alice
|0〉 12 0 0 12 cos2 γ1 12 sin2 γ1 0
|1〉 0 12 0 12 sin2 γ1 cos2 γ2 12 cos2 γ1 cos2 γ2 12 sin2 γ2
|2〉 0 0 12 12 sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 12 cos2 γ1 sin2 γ2 12 cos2 γ2∣∣0′〉 12 cos2 γ1 12 sin2 γ1 cos2 γ2 12 sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 12 0 0∣∣1′〉 12 sin2 γ1 12 cos2 γ1 cos2 γ2 12 cos2 γ1 sin2 γ2 0 12 0∣∣2′〉 0 12 sin2 γ2 12 cos2 γ2 0 0 12
TABLE II: Theoretical probabilities for obtaining Bell state |φ0〉 for different combination of states after normalization
III. COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY ISSUES FOR QUBIT WITH QUTRIT
In this section we compare the security issues of MDI QPQ protocol for qubit with qutrit assuming one of the
parties is dishonest.
A. Database Security
In case of database security we assume that Alice is dishonest. Her goal is to exact more element from the database
except her query. This will be possible if she can increase her success probability to guess a key bit than what is
suggested by the protocol. In this subsection we will see how we can reduce the success probability of Alice and hence
can enhance the database security exploiting qutrit.
From Table 2 we now calculate the success probability of Alice to guess a raw key bit of Bob. Let A be a random
variable that Alice has guessed about B (random variable possessed by Bob). Thus the probability of success can be
written as
Pr(A = B) = Pr(A = 0, B = 0) + Pr(A = 1, B = 1)
= Pr(A = 0|B = 0)Pr(B = 0)
+Pr(A = 1|B = 1)Pr(B = 1)
=
1
2
[Pr(A = 0|B = 0) + Pr(A = 1|B = 1)]
= p(γ1, γ2)
Now,
Pr(A = 0|B = 0) = 1
3
[Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = |0〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = |1〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣2′〉 , B′ = |1〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = |2〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = |2〉)]
=
1
6
(2 sin
2
γ1 + 2 sin
2
γ2 − sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2)
Where the event C = |φ0〉 implies Charlie measures |φ0〉. A′ and B′ represent the states sent by Alice and Bob
respectively.
From Table 2, it is clear that, Pr(A = 0|B = 0) = Pr(A = 1|B = 1) because of symmetry and thus,
p(γ1, γ2) = Pr(A = B)
=
1
6
(2 sin
2
γ1 + 2 sin
2
γ2 − sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2).
Figure 1 shows the change in the database privacy with the change of γ1 and γ2. In case of MDI QPQ with qubits [14],
the success probability of Alice to obtain a conclusive raw key is p′(θ) = sin
2 θ
2 , where the parameter θ ∈ (0, pi2 ) is
chosen by Bob.
Note that in case of qutrit the success probability of Alice contains two parameters γ1, γ2. However, in case of
qubit it contains only one parameter θ. So, we cannot compare our result with [14] in general. To show which one
5FIG. 1: Change in the database privacy with γ1 and γ2.
FIG. 2: Comparison of database privacy for 3D MDI QPQ and 2D MDI QPQ.
gives better database privacy we have to keep at least one of the parameters for qutrit fixed and compare another
with θ.
Let us define, R1 := {γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, pi2 ) : − sin2 γ1 + 2 sin2 γ2 − sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 < 0} and R2 := {γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, pi2 ) :
2 sin2 γ1 − sin2 γ2 − sin2 γ1 sin2 γ2 < 0}. We can see that, in the region R1, p(γ1, γ2) < p′(γ1) and in the region R2,
p(γ1, γ2) < p
′(γ2). That means in these two regions Alice’s success probability reduces if we consider qutrit. As the
database is encrypted by the key possessed by Bob, thus if we can reduce the success probability of Alice to guess a
key bit of Bob, we can increase the security of the database.
The MDI QPQ protocol using qutrits with parameters (γ1, γ2) ∈ R1 gives better database security than the MDI
QPQ protocol using qubits with the parameter θ = γ1. Similarly the MDI QPQ protocol with qutrit and with
(γ1, γ2) ∈ R2 gives better database security than the MDI QPQ protocol with qubits and with θ = γ2. Figure 2
shows the region for R1 and R2 with red and blue shades respectively. In other words, for the values of (γ1, γ2) in
the colored region of the Figure 2, 3d-MDI QPQ protocol gives better database security than 2d-MDI QPQ protocol
performed with either γ1 or γ2.
6B. User Privacy
User privacy is analyzed against Middle State Attack introduced in [12]. In the Middle State Attack it is assumed
that Bob is dishonest. He tries to guess the position of the key bit that Alice has obtained with certainty.
Now, we will revisit [14] to understand how the Middle State Attack for MDI QPQ with qubits has been defended.
At first, we will consider the case when both Bob and Alice are honest.
At the beginning of the protocol, Bob and Alice send one of the four polarized photons |0〉 , |1〉 , |0′〉 , |1′〉 uniformly
at random to the BSM possessed by Alice, where
|0′〉 = cos θ |0〉+ sin θ |1〉
|1′〉 = sin θ |0〉 − cos θ |1〉 .
The rectilinear basis {|0〉 , |1〉} is encoded to the key bit 0 and the basis {|0′〉 , |1′〉} is encoded to the key bit 1. For
each measurement output ∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉),
Bob will declare a key bit 0 if he has sent |0〉 or |0′〉 and 1 for |1〉 or |1′〉. Probability of obtaining |ψ−〉 for different
possibilities are shown in the Table 3.
Bob
Alice
|0〉 |1〉 |0′〉 |1′〉
|0〉 0 1
2
1
2
sin2 θ 1
2
cos2 θ
|1〉 1
2
0 1
2
cos2 θ 1
2
sin2 θ
|0′〉 1
2
sin2 θ 1
2
cos2 θ 0 1
2
|1′〉 1
2
cos2 θ 1
2
sin2 θ 1
2
0
TABLE III: Theoretical probabilities of obtaining
∣∣ψ−〉 for different combination of honest states
Based on the declaration of Bob and the qubit Alice has sent, Alice can guess Bob’s qubit with certainty. For
example, suppose Bob has sent |0〉 and declared 0, then from Table 3 it can be seen that Alice guesses Bob’s qubit
only when she has sent |0′〉. In this case she will conclude the key bit as 0. The probability that Alice can guess a
conclusive raw key bit is sin
2 θ
2 .
For simplicity we consider that Alice and Bob choose the same θ. Another variant of the protocol is discussed
in [14] where one of them uses θ and other one uses (θ + pi2 ). The analysis is same for both the variants.
In case of Middle State Attack a dishonest Bob sends a qubit uniformly at random in the following form
|0′′〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉
|1′′〉 = sin θ
2
|0〉 − cos θ
2
|1〉
and declares 1 if he has sent |0′′〉 and 0 if he has sent |1′′〉. Probabilities of obtaining |ψ−〉 for different possibilities in
this case is shown in the Table 4.
Alice
Bob
|0〉 |1〉 |0′〉 |1′〉
|0′′〉 1
2
sin2 θ
2
1
2
cos2 θ
2
1
2
sin2 θ
2
1
2
cos2 θ
2
|1′′〉 1
2
cos2 θ
2
1
2
sin2 θ
2
1
2
cos2 θ
2
1
2
sin2 θ
2
TABLE IV: Theoretical probabilities of obtaining
∣∣ψ−〉 for different combination of middle states
Let us consider the instance when Bob has sent |0′′〉 and declares 1. In this case Alice will conclude her key bit as
0 if she has sent |1′〉 and 1 if she has sent |1〉.
Now, the probability to guess a key bit as 0 by Alice is
p
qubit
0 = Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = ∣∣1′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
=
1
2
cos
2 θ
2
7FIG. 3: Comparison in database privacy for honest Bob and dishonest Bob for qubits.
and the probability to guess a key bit as 1 by Alice is
p
qubit
1 = Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = |1〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
=
1
2
cos
2 θ
2
Let E be the event that Alice concludes the raw key bit with certainty. Hence, the total probability to get a
conclusive raw key bit by Alice is
p
qubit
c,mid = Pr(E)
= Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣0′′〉) Pr(B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣1′′〉) Pr(B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)
=
1
2
[Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣0′′〉) + Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)]
=
1
2
[Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = ∣∣1′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = |1〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = ∣∣0′〉 , B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)
+Pr(BSM =
∣∣∣ψ−〉 |A′ = |0〉 , B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)]
= cos
2 θ
2
Figure 3 shows the success probability of Alice for honest and dishonest Bob in case of MDI QPQ with qubits.
From the Figure 3, it is clear that for θ ∈ (0, pi2 ), cos2 θ2 > 12 sin2 θ. Thus, mounting the Middle State Attack Bob
can increase the success probability of Alice to get a conclusive key bit.
The motivation of Bob to increase the success probability of Alice is to track the positions where there is a higher
probability to get a conclusive key bits. However, he can not decide if it is 0 or 1 as the success probability of Alice
to get the key bit as 0 and as 1 is same. In this case he has to insert the key bits randomly. And this will introduce
an error in the channel. When Alice and Bob perform error correction this error is identified. Alice will identify this
error as quantum bit error rate (QBER). In this case, QBER is equal to 12 . Noticing this Alice will abort the Protocol.
In case of qutrit, Bob will send one of the following states uniformly at random to Charlie and announces 1, 2, 0
respectively to Alice.
|0′′〉 = cos γ12 |0〉+ sin γ12 cos γ22 |1〉+ sin γ12 sin γ22 |2〉 ,
|1′′〉 = − sin γ12 |0〉+ cos γ12 cos γ22 |1〉+ cos γ12 sin γ22 |2〉 ,
|2′′〉 = − sin γ22 |1〉+ cos γ22 |2〉
Theoretical probabilities (after normalization) for obtaining the Bell state |φ0〉 in this case are shown in the Table 5.
8Bob∣∣0′′〉 ∣∣1′′〉 ∣∣2′′〉
Alice
|0〉 12 cos2
γ1
2
1
2 sin
2 γ1
2 0
|1〉 12 sin2
γ1
2 cos
2 γ2
2
1
2 cos
2 γ1
2 cos
2 γ2
2
1
2 sin
2 γ2
2
|2〉 12 sin2
γ1
2 sin
2 γ2
2
1
2 cos
2 γ1
2 sin
2 γ2
2
1
2 cos
2 γ2
2
∣∣0′〉 12 (cos γ1 cos γ12 12 (cos γ1 sin γ12 12 sin2 γ1 sin2 γ22
+sin γ1 sin
γ1
2 cos
γ2
2 )
2 − sin γ1 cos γ12 cos
γ2
2 )
2
∣∣1′〉 12 (sin γ1 cos γ12 12 (sin γ1 sin γ12 12 cos2 γ1 sin2 γ22
− cos γ1 sin γ12 cos
γ2
2 )
2 +cos γ1 cos
γ1
2 cos
γ2
2 )
2
∣∣2′〉 12 sin2 γ12 sin2 γ22 12 cos2 γ12 sin2 γ22 12 cos2 γ22
TABLE V: Theoretical probabilities for obtaining Bell state |φ0〉 for dishonest Bob and honest Alice
Let us now consider the instance when Bob sends |0′′〉 to Charlie and declare the trit 1. As Alice is honest, Alice
will conclude her raw key bit as 0 if she has sent |0′〉 or |2′〉 and 1 if she has sent |0〉 or |2〉. Similar thing happens for
other cases also.
Let E be the event that Alice concludes the raw key bit with certainty. Then the total probability of obtaining a
conclusive raw key bit by Alice is
p
mid
c = Pr(E)
= Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)Pr(B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)Pr(B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)
+Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣2′′〉)Pr(B′ = ∣∣2′′〉)
=
1
3
[Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣0′′〉) + Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣1′′〉) + Pr(E|B′ = ∣∣2′′〉)]
=
1
3
[Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |0〉 , B′ =
∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |2〉 , B′ =
∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣2′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |1〉 , B′ =
∣∣1′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = ∣∣1′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |1〉 , B′ =
∣∣2′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |2〉 , B′ =
∣∣2′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = ∣∣2′′〉)]
=
1
6
[2 + 2 sin
2 γ1
2
sin
2 γ2
2
+ 2 cos
2 γ1
2
cos
2 γ2
2
+ cos
2
γ1 sin
2 γ2
2
+ (cos γ1 cos
γ1
2
+ sin γ1 sin
γ1
2
cos
γ2
2
)
2
]
Figure 4 shows the comparison in the probability of obtaining a raw key bit by Alice when Bob performs the protocol
honestly with the probability of obtaining a raw key bit by Alice when Bob performs the protocol dishonestly. Black
surface shows the variation in probability with respect to γ1 and γ2 for honest Bob and the yellow surface shows the
same when Bob sends middle states. It is clear from the figure that, the probability to get a key bit by Alice is very
high in case of middle state than the honest performance of the protocol.
Now, let us consider the example when Bob sends |0′′〉 and declares 1. In this case Alice will conclude the key bit
9FIG. 4: Comparison in database privacy for honest Bob and dishonest Bob for qutrits.
as 0 if she has sent |0′〉 or |2′〉 and 1 if she has sent |0〉 or |2〉. The probability to get conclusive raw key bit as 0 is
p0 = Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣2′〉 , B′ = ∣∣0′′〉)
=
1
2
((cos γ1 cos
γ1
2
+ sin γ1 sin
γ1
2
cos
γ2
2
)
2
+ sin
2 γ1
2
sin
2 γ2
2
)
Similarly, the probability to get conclusive raw key bit as 1 is
p1 = Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |0〉 , B′ =
∣∣0′′〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ = |2〉 , B′ =
∣∣0′′〉)
=
1
2
(cos
2 γ1
2
+ sin
2 γ1
2
sin
2 γ2
2
).
Now,
cos
γ2
2 < 1,
⇒ sin γ1 sin γ12 cos
γ2
2 < sin γ1 sin
γ1
2
⇒ cos γ1 cos γ12 + sin γ1 sin
γ1
2 cos
γ2
2 < cos γ1 cos
γ1
2 + sin γ1 sin
γ1
2
⇒ (cos γ1 cos γ12 + sin γ1 sin
γ1
2 cos
γ2
2 )
2 < cos2
γ1
2
⇒ 12 [(cos γ1 cos
γ1
2 + sin γ1 sin
γ1
2 cos
γ2
2 )
2 + sin2
γ1
2 sin
2 γ2
2 ] <
1
2 (cos
2 γ1
2 + sin
2 γ1
2 sin
2 γ2
2 )
⇒ p0 < p1,
for all γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, pi2 ).
As p0 < p1, with a very high probability Alice will conclude the key bit as 1. Bob also encodes this event with the
key bit 1. And hence, the key bit of Alice and the key bit of Bob matches with high probability.
Now with this Middle State Attack Bob can guess the position j of Alice’s key bit with a very high probability.
When Alice sends s = j−i, Bob will immediately come to know the position i of the the database element as i = j−s.
For the other two declarations, i.e., for 2 and 0, the same thing happens.
The attack can be defended if we set threshold for error probability at error correcting phase strictly less than p0.
This is because, with probability p0, Alice sets the key bit as 0. However, in that case, Bob will set the key bit as 1.
This error is identified in error correcting phase. If the threshold value for error probability is higher than p0, Bob
will pass the test and can mount the attack successfully. On the other hand, setting the threshold value strictly below
p0, one can resist Bob to mount the attack.
Another way to defend this attack is to set p0 = p1 i.e., when γ2 = 0. In that case, the second basis states becomes
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|0′〉 = cos γ1 |0〉+ sin γ1 |1〉 ,
|1′〉 = − sin γ1 |0〉+ cos γ1 |1〉 ,
|2′〉 = |2〉
This case is similar to MDI QPQ with qubits [14].
IV. A SPACIAL CASE
In this section we will discuss MDI QPQ protocol for Fourier basis. The Fourier basis states are as follows.
|0′〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉),
|1′〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ ω2 |1〉+ ω |2〉),
|2′〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ ω |1〉+ ω2 |2〉).
where ω = e
2pii
3 .
The state |0′〉 belongs to a specific ensemble with γ2 = pi4 and cos γ1 = 1√3 . The set {|0′〉 , |1′〉 , |2′〉} form an
orthonormal basis and is related to the computational basis by Discrete Fourier Transform.
Now the 3d-MDI QPQ protocol will be performed with this new set of basis. For the earlier case, Alice and Bob
have to consider the cases where the measurement output was |φ0〉, whereas for this case they can choose any of the
nine Bell states. Theoretical probabilities for obtaining |φ0〉 for different combinations are shown in the Table 6.
Bob
|0〉 |1〉 |2〉 |0′〉 |1′〉 |2′〉
Alice
|0〉 1
3
0 0 1
9
1
9
1
9
|1〉 0 1
3
0 1
9
1
9
1
9
|2〉 0 0 1
3
1
9
1
9
1
9
|0′〉 1
9
1
9
1
9
1
3
0 0
|1′〉 1
9
1
9
1
9
0 1
3
0
|2′〉 1
9
1
9
1
9
0 0 1
3
TABLE VI: Theoretical probabilities for obtaining Bell state |φ0〉 for different combination of states
Bob
|0〉 |1〉 |2〉 ∣∣0′〉 ∣∣1′〉 ∣∣2′〉
Alice
|0〉 12 0 0 16 16 16
|1〉 0 12 0 16 16 16
|2〉 0 0 12 16 16 16∣∣0′〉 16 16 16 12 0 0∣∣1′〉 16 16 16 0 12 0∣∣2′〉 16 16 16 0 0 12
TABLE VII: Theoretical probabilities for obtaining Bell state |φ0〉 for different combination of states after normalization
The protocol remains same as earlier. To avoid repetition we do not write the whole protocol once again. From
Table 7, we can calculate the success probability of Alice to obtain a conclusive key bit.
p = Pr(A = B)
= Pr(A = 0, B = 0) + Pr(A = 1, B = 1)
= Pr(A = 0|B = 0)Pr(B = 0)
+Pr(A = 1|B = 1)Pr(B = 1)
=
1
2
[Pr(A = 0|B = 0) + Pr(A = 1|B = 1)]
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Now,
Pr(A = 0|B = 0) = 1
3
[Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = |0〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣2′〉 , B′ = |0〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = |1〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣2′〉 , B′ = |1〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣0′〉 , B′ = |2〉)
+Pr(C = |φ0〉 |A′ =
∣∣1′〉 , B′ = |2〉)]
=
1
3
(6× 1
6
)
=
1
3
As Pr(A = 0|B = 0) = Pr(A = 1|B = 1), we can write,
p = Pr(A = B)
=
1
3
In case of qubits the success probability of Alice to get a conclusive key bit in Fourier basis is 14 [11]. Contrary to
this, here it becomes 13 . Thus, in this case we will not obtain better database security. And hence, we do not bother
about the Middle State Attack.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been identified that in Quantum Key Distribution higher dimension provides better security. In [4] the
enhancement in the key rate of MDI QKD has been achieved exploiting qutrit. Motivated by this we try to understand
whether this is the case for general cryptographic primitives.
In this direction, we explore MDI QPQ with qutrit. Our analysis shows a counter intuitive result. We observe that
though database security can be enhanced using qutrit, the client’s privacy becomes vulnerable. We can not optimize
both the database and client security in three dimension simultaneously. Hence, we conclude that higher dimension
is not always advantageous in case of cryptographic primitives. It varies from protocol to protocol.
In the present draft we explore MDI-QPQ only. What happens for other QPQ protocols in three dimension would
be very interesting cryptanalysis. Analysis of security issues for MDI QPQ and other QPQ protocols for greater than
3 dimension is our future research plan.
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